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ON THE ECONOMY OF CONCEPTS 
IN PROPERTY 
HENRY E. SMITH† 
Concepts help economize on information.  Conventional wisdom correctly 
associates conceptualism with formalism but misunderstands the role concepts 
play in law.  Commentators from the Legal Realists onward have paid insuffi-
cient attention to the distinction between concepts and the categories they pick 
out (or, to borrow from philosophical semantics, the intension and extension of 
legal relations).  Even though two concepts may identify the same category, they 
can differ greatly in terms of information costs.  This Article applies tools of 
cognitive science to explore the economics of legal concepts.  Both the mind and 
the law are information-processing devices that manage complexity and econo-
mize on information by employing concepts and rules, the specific-over-general 
principle, modularity, and recursion.  These devices work in tandem to produce 
the economizing architecture of property.  As in cognitive science, we expect sim-
plicity of description and generality of explanation to coincide.  This Article 
then applies the cognitive theory of property to longstanding puzzles like the role 
of baselines—such as nemo dat (“one cannot give that which one does not 
have”) and ad coelum (“one who owns the soil owns to the heavens above and 
the depths below”)—the notion of title, and the function of equity as a safety 
valve for the law.  The theory developed here provides a more elegant description 
of the law, better generalizes to new situations, and therefore helps to explain 
and justify the robustness of traditional baselines in property law.  The cognitive 
theory also allows one to reconcile reductionism and holism in property theory, as 
well as static and process descriptions of the contours of property. 
 
† Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I would like to thank Andrew 
Gold, Sun-Joo Shin, and the participants at the Symposium on New Dimensions in 
Property Theory, jointly sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review and the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and a Law and Economics Colloquium at the 
George Mason University School of Law for their helpful comments.  All errors are mine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal conceptualism has long been in bad odor, and nowhere 
more so than in property.  Yet, outside of law, concepts are part of the 
basic furniture of our mental life.  Accordingly, concepts—including 
the concept of a concept—have been analyzed by disciplines like phi-
losophy and cognitive science. 
This Article will reevaluate the role of concepts in property using 
the tools of cognitive science.  These tools help explain how the mind 
is shaped by its limits, which limit the use of context.  I will present 
parallels between cognitive science and the information-cost theory of 
property. 
For our purposes, general concepts economize on information 
cost, because they pick out large classes of entities or situations at 
once.  The related notion of general ideas, or “abstraction,” has been 
important in political and economic thought.  For example, de 
Tocqueville recognized that despite being imperfect, general ideas are 
useful in a complex society: 
 The Deity does not view the human race collectively.  With one 
glance He sees every human being separately and sees in each the resem-
blances that makes him like his fellows and the differences which isolate 
him from them. 
It follows that God has no need of general ideas, that is to say, He never 
feels the necessity of giving the same label to a considerable number of 
analogous objects in order to think about them more conveniently . . . . 
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General ideas do not bear witness to the power of human intelligence 
but rather to its inadequacy . . . .  
General ideas have this excellent quality, that they permit human 
minds to pass judgment quickly on a great number of things; but the con-
ceptions they convey are always incomplete, and what is gained in extent is 
always lost in exactitude.1 
Hayek put great weight on abstractness as necessary for spontane-
ous order, including the one he saw arising in the common law.2  Hayek 
believed that the common law was based largely on earlier custom that 
had proven itself and evolved in practice.3  Through the common law, 
dispersed knowledge could produce results that no single mind could 
achieve on its own.  Although Hayek overestimated the evolved nature 
of the common law and the role that rules, as opposed to standards, 
play in legal regimes,4 I argue that in the hybrid systems we do see, the 
basic setup of law relies on general, abstract—and formal—rules for 
the reasons recognized by de Tocqueville and Hayek.  This recogni-
tion of the limits of the mind and the law suggests a theory of when 
formalism makes sense.  
By drawing on philosophy and cognitive science, this Article shows 
how law and economics can help explain legal concepts.  Concepts 
both in law and outside it respond to the same kinds of costs and ben-
efits and a similar need to manage complexity.  Property law helps 
organize the activity of many minds by furnishing a platform through 
which people navigate relations with others with respect to things.  
Concepts within property law manage the complexity of those interac-
tions and economize on information costs.   
The Article offers a sketch of how a cognitive theory of property 
might work.  Part I shows how legal concepts can be analyzed with the 
tools of philosophy and psychology.  Like concepts generally, legal 
concepts can be regarded as ways of presenting things in the world.  
 
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 402 ( J .P. Mayer & Max Lerner 
eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835).   
2 See, e.g., 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY:  RULES AND OR-
DER 44 (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER] (arguing that the abstraction of 
general rules leads “individuals to behave in a manner which makes social life possible”); 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 149 (1960) (explaining that uncon-
sciously abstracted rules guide individual interactions and avoid a “trial of strength”). 
3 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 2, at 84-88, 94-95, 104-05, 118. 
4 See generally Ronald Hamowy, F.A. Hayek and the Common Law, 23 CATO J. 241, 252 
(2003) (arguing that even in its early history, the common law would not have survived 
if not supplemented with equitable standards); John Hasnas, Hayek, the Common Law, 
and Fluid Drive, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 79, 104 (2005) (arguing that the common law, 
as opposed to customary law, requires judges to “consciously creat[e] rules”). 
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Part II presents some tools from cognitive science that have been use-
ful in modeling the mind’s methods of economizing on information.  
These include, in addition to concepts and rules, the specific-over-
general principle, modularity, and recursion.  Concepts and other 
formal devices of property law suppress some context for a reason:  
they manage complexity by organizing the world into components 
whose internal workings are only partially visible to the rest of the sys-
tem.  Partial information hiding allows such components to be selec-
tive “black boxes.”  The most obvious, though not exclusive, set of such 
components are the “things” that property defines.   
Part III applies the cognitive theory developed here to several puz-
zling issues of baselines in property, including the nemo dat principle 
(“one cannot give that which one does not have”), the ad coelum rule 
(that a landowner owns “to the heavens above and the depths below”), 
the notion of title, and the role of equity as a modification of the law.  
These baselines receive a more elegant and more generalizable descrip-
tion, which helps explain and justify their robustness in the law.  This 
analysis also illustrates how the cognitive theory reconciles in-principle 
reductionism in property theory with “pragmatic holism.”  The Article 
concludes with observations about the role of formalism in property and 
how that role is illuminated by the cognitive analysis of concepts.  
I.  WHAT IS A LEGAL CONCEPT? 
In philosophy and psychology, concepts are far from an obstacle to 
thought:  they allow for prediction, communication, and abstract thought, 
when a mass of particulars is not useful.  Concepts organize particulars 
into useful sets—or, to borrow the terminology of psychology, con-
cepts pick out categories.  Although it is sometimes easy to forget—-and 
the Legal Realists appear sometimes indeed to have forgotten—
concepts are not the same as the things those concepts pick out.   
 What is the relationship of concepts to categories?  Some philoso-
phers regard concepts as functions from states of the world to sets of 
objects.  Such a function is called an “intension.”  The set of things 
denoted is sometimes called an “extension.”  The meaning of a word 
can be associated with intensions or extensions, and either choice has 
many implications.5  For our purposes, it is enough to note the differ-
 
5 For examples of sources in linguistics discussing intensionality, see GENNARO 
CHIERCHIA & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, MEANING AND GRAMMAR:  AN INTRODUCTION 
TO SEMANTICS 257-328 (2d ed. 2000), DAVID R. DOWTY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO MON-
TAGUE SEMANTICS 141-78 (1981), Richard Montague, The Proper Treatment of Quantifica-
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ent roles played by intensions and extensions.  An intension, roughly 
like a concept, mediates between the world (or possible worlds) and 
sets of objects in the world or worlds.  An intension is modeled as a 
function from worlds to referents; it is a way of picking out referents.   
Returning to word meaning, a word is associated both with func-
tions from worlds to referents and with those referents themselves—
intensions and extensions.  Consider a famous example.  The expres-
sions “morning star” and “evening star” both refer to the planet Venus—
they have the same extension—but they have two different intensions.6  
Both phrases have an intension that takes us from states of the world 
to the planet Venus—the same extension.  But the way of getting there 
is different.7  
The distinction between different intensions that have the same 
referent emerges in epistemic contexts—sentences that describe men-
tal states like belief.  “John believes that the morning star is a planet” 
does not entail “John believes that the evening star is a planet” (nor 
vice versa).  Further, the sentence “the morning star is the same object 
as the evening star” is informative.  Thus, concepts are not the same as 
the categories they pick out. 
In short, concepts matter in epistemic contexts.  This is significant 
for legal scholars because legal relations have their form based in part 
on people’s cognitive limitations.  With full knowledge (as in the zero-
transaction-cost world or de Tocqueville’s divine perspective), we would 
have less need to distinguish intensions from extensions.  Beliefs about 
the morning star and the evening star would coincide, and it would be 
less important to distinguish each idea from the object Venus.  Similarly, 
in the legal realm, there would be no need to distinguish actual legal 
relations from sets of legal consequences holding between individuals.  
Legal relations could be as articulated as one wished and their conse-
quences could be achieved by any route that would get there.  Legal 
concepts as intensions (which, I argue, is at least a good analogy if not 
 
tion in Ordinary English, in APPROACHES TO NATURAL LANGUAGE:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
1970 STANFORD WORKSHOP ON GRAMMAR AND SEMANTICS 221, 228-32 (K.J.J. Hintikka 
et al. eds., 1973), and Robert Stalnaker, Propositions, in ISSUES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1972 OBERLIN COLLOQUIUM IN PHILOSOPHY 79 
(Alfred F. MacKay & Daniel D. Merrill eds., 1976). 
6 In epistemic contexts the referent of the noun phrase in question is its intension. 
7 This example goes back to Frege, who provided the philosophical roots of in-
tensional logic.  See Gottlob Frege, On Sinn and Bedeutung (Max Black trans.) (trans-
lating Gottlob Frege, Über Sinn und Bedeutung, 100 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE 
UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK 25 (1892)), in THE FREGE READER 151, 156 (Michael 
Beaney ed., 1997). 
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the correct analysis) would coincide completely with these legal exten-
sions.  Concepts, intensions, and delineation within the law are all 
mental shortcuts, as are concepts in our mental life more generally. 
The distinction between intension and extension illuminates the 
nature of Hohfeldian analysis and its contribution to the bundle of 
rights theory of property.  Hohfeldian analysis basically asks for the 
bottom line:  who gets to do what to whom with respect to what.  
Hohfeld pursued this approach by seeking the smallest units of analy-
sis—the “lowest common denominators” of the law—and then build-
ing up larger aggregates, such as the packages of entitlements we call 
“property” from these smaller pieces.8  Hohfeld defined two types of 
basic pieces.  First, he developed his system of jural correlatives and 
opposites:  rights correlate to duties, privileges to no-rights, powers to 
liabilities, and immunities to disabilities.9  Very elegantly, rights were 
also the opposite of no-rights, privileges of duties, powers of disabili-
ties, and liabilities of immunities.10  Second, he tried to break down the 
notion of in rem relations to collections of smaller relations holding 
individually between pairs of people.11   
Controversy over Hohfeld’s scheme reflected how commentators 
emphasized intension or extension differently.  Albert Kocourek criti-
cized Hohfeld’s scheme for failing to capture the distinctive nature of 
in rem rights.12  He argued both that numerosity of duty bearers was 
not the only characteristic that defined an in rem right and that some 
indefiniteness of the class of duty bearers was also important.13  To 
demonstrate, he hypothesized that, for an owner who granted an ease-
ment to everyone in the world except A, the duty bearer is singular but 
bears an in rem duty.14  Kocourek proposed that an in rem right was 
one in which the facts used to delineate the right do not directly iden-
tify the duty holder.15  In response, Arthur Corbin defended Hohfeld’s 
 
8 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 58 (1913) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
9 Id. at 30. 
10 Id. 
11 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718-23 (1917) (reducing “in rem–ness” to the numerosity of 
the duty holders).  
12 See Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 322, 335 (1920) (arguing 
that a definition of in rem should not be “based on” the characteristic of the large 
“number of persons who owe duties corresponding to rights in rem” because such a 
requirement is “not essential”).  
13 Id. at 332-33. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 325-29. 
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quantitative approach to “in rem–ness” by stressing exclusively the ex-
tensional aspect of legal relations: 
[Hohfeld’s eight terms] are fundamental because they are the conceptions 
out of which in various combinations we construct our conceptions of 
property, ownership, trust, easement, license, right of entry, patent, fran-
chise, chose in action, contract, debt, quasi-contract, and other important 
complexities.  They are fundamental because they are constant elements, 
into which all of our variable combinations can be analyzed, common de-
nominators to which the superficially dissimilar, like law and equity, prop-
erty and contract, can be reduced. . . . [I]t is a great service if they enable 
us to see similarities and distinctions otherwise concealed and help us to-
ward a consistent legal system.  To adopt and use them does not mean that 
we must abandon our former language and our former more complex 
conceptions of variable content.  We shall still talk of property and con-
tracts and trusts; but we shall also have at our command the machinery of a 
more exact analysis when the case requires it.
16
 
What Corbin describes as a concept is a set of legal consequences, 
or concepts very closely tied to a narrow set of concrete legal conse-
quences.  He is interested solely in predicting how legal decisionmakers 
will behave:  from the behavioral point of view, the bottom line in 
terms of lowest common denominators is all we need.17  In his view, 
while it is permissible to speak of notions like “property,” those no-
tions do no independent work.18  By contrast, Kocourek’s emphasis on 
“investitive” facts can be interpreted as providing some room in the 
theory for alternative methods of delineation.19   
Corbin, like the later Realists, (wrongly) believed that merely rec-
ognizing that legal relations hold between persons makes clear that 
the delineation of relations by means of artificial entities is mystical 
nonsense.20  However, defining an in rem right in A against “others 
generally” is very different from specifying the pairwise right-duty rela-
tions holding between A and each of B, C, D, etc. in society.  They are 
 
16 Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 228-
30 (1921). 
17 See id. at 226 (“In determining what is the law in any given case, we are invariably 
interested in finding the answer to one question:  what will our organized society, act-
ing through its appointed agents, do?”). 
18 See id. at 229 (“One may well have not the slightest interest in [those notions] ex-
cept so far as they are useful in actual life . . . .”). 
19 Kocourek, supra note 12, at 327. 
20 Corbin associated this view regarding artificial entities with sinister formalism.  
See Cortbin, supra note 16, at 227 n.2 (arguing that recognizing that jural relations are 
ultimately about individuals “sends to the scrap heap a deal of juristic nonsense about 
corporate ‘entities’ and rights of ‘the state’ and ‘social interests’ and other cherished fic-
tions—cherished among ourselves as well as among our quondam friends in Prussia”). 
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extensionally equivalent but intensionally very different—something 
not captured in either the Hohfeld-Corbin approach or in later ver-
sions of Realism.  The intension–extension distinction is particularly 
important for property because property characteristically holds be-
tween people in general and covers uses of resources.  Property is a 
shortcut for the more complete set of pairwise relations among micro-
users that could be achieved in a Hohfeldian analysis.  Indeed, Aus-
tin’s declaration that the essence of property is its indefiniteness cap-
tures this point21:  the shortcuts property uses in delineating in rem 
rights save on transaction costs precisely because they are indefinite.  
They are an example of de Tocqueville’s general ideas, suited to those 
lacking the divine perspective.  
In terms of both breaking the basic legal relations down into their 
smallest relational pieces and seeing in rem rights as a collection of 
individual rights, the synthetic Hohfeldian and Realist approach may 
be extensionally equivalent to a right to a thing good against the 
world, but it is intensionally very different.  A right to a thing good 
against the world need not be explicitly defined along a number of 
dimensions.  By defining a thing and using trespass as a basic mode of 
protection, many of the protected privileges of use can remain implicit.  
The very ambiguity that Hohfeld decried in using the term “right” to 
cover both true claims and privileges (liberties) may be seen as a by-
product of costly delineation.  Property involves innumerable privileges 
of use; one can always specify the use more narrowly, as in use for 
parking cars, use for parking cars on Mondays, use for parking cars on 
Mondays between 2 and 3 p.m., use for parking Chevrolets on Mon-
days between 2 and 3 p.m., etc.  But generally, leaving the use privileg-
es implicit is sufficient.  When a resource conflict becomes severe 
enough, the law will pick out a use and may regard that use as a sub-
ject of a right rather than a privilege.  This tendency is most explicit in 
the case of easements, but it also occurs with nuisance.  The “Hohfeld-
ian” intensions—functions from states of the world to packages of enti-
tlements—are usually more elaborate than the delineation of actual 
property interests.  Relatedly, consider the residual claim:  it too could 
be formed synthetically out of all the small pieces or sticks.  Or we can 
define it as the right to an asset after all the other more specific claims 
have been carved out.  Same extension, different intensions. 
 
21 See, e.g., 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
POSITIVE LAW 799 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. London, John Murray 1885) 
(“[I]ndefiniteness is of the very essence of the right; and implies that the right . . . can-
not be determined by exact and positive circumscription.”). 
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Intensions and concepts partially capture reality by focusing on 
only some aspects.  This selectivity makes the use of concepts and cate-
gories somewhat formal, in the sense that they are less than fully re-
sponsive to contextual information.  Not coincidentally, formalism has 
been as controversial as conceptualism in property, and for similar 
reasons.  Academics identified the two with each other in the Realist 
era.22  Conceptualism has continued to be associated with “formalism.”  
Although formalism has come to mean many things (mainly nega-
tive),23 I argue that the Realists were right to identify conceptualism 
with formalism but wrong in dismissing concepts for that reason. 
The most useful notion of formalism (with roots in both cognitive 
science and economics) is relative indifference to context (the extent 
to which interpretation is invariant to context).24  A language or rule 
system (as well as instances, like sentences or individual rules) is more 
formal the less its interpretation or application depends on context.  
By picking out certain facts as the basis for a function from possible 
worlds to sets of things, concepts employ formalism.  To be useful, the 
concept has to pick out enough facts to serve the purpose in question 
but not so many that it entails too much complexity.  Optimal con-
cepts thus have a medium level of generality.25 
Notions like the right to exclude and seeing the owner as a gate-
keeper to an asset are sometimes considered too formal because they 
are not responsive enough to societal needs in a variety of contexts.26  
The law provides doctrines for overriding both rights to exclude and 
 
22 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820 (1935) (“In every field of law we should find peculiar concepts 
which are not defined either in terms of empirical fact or in terms of ethics but which 
are used to answer empirical and ethical questions alike, and thus bar the way to intel-
ligent investigation of social fact and social policy.”). 
23 Compare MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA:  THE REVOLT AGAINST 
FORMALISM 12-13 (Beacon Press 1957) (1947) (tracing the various attacks historically 
levied against formalism), with Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U.  
TORONTO L.J. 607, 611-12 (2007) (characterizing classical formalism as viewing law as 
“composed of concepts and rules”).  
24 Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression, 4 FOUND. SCI. 
25, 26-27 (1999). 
25 Cf. Douglas Glen Whitman, The Rules of Abstraction, 22 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 21, 
23-28 (2009) (explaining that we rely upon intermediate abstraction, particularly in 
the law, to “deal with . . . complexity by filtering it, deeming some features relevant 
while ignoring others”).  One can regard concepts as components of modular systems:  
the concept suppresses some information in order to manage complexity.  See infra 
Section II.C. 
26 Much of this debate is couched in terms of whether there is a “core” to property 
and, if so, whether it has anything to do with exclusion.  See infra note 28. 
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the owner-gatekeeper’s wishes,27 but much commentary rejects exclu-
sionary conceptions of rights to things as any baseline or starting point 
at all.28 
The controversies over exclusion stem in part from a failure to dis-
tinguish intensions and extensions, or concepts versus consequences.  
Commentators subscribing to the gatekeeper view focus on the con-
cept of property whereas the Realists and their progeny are primarily 
concerned with the consequences of property.  Both are important.  
There is a difference between a concept and an object in the world, as 
the Realists never tired of pointing out.29  But it is a fallacy then to 
conclude that all functions from the world to sets of things—that all 
modes of presenting results—are equivalent.  Even with extensional 
equivalence, one set of concepts can lower information costs more 
than another.   
Although rights can be analyzed into their smallest constituents, it 
is not cost-effective to create them this way, largely because of infor-
mation costs.  The set of concepts in use is a small subset of the set of 
possible concepts.  The same is true of language:  we tend to have 
words for the most useful concepts and rely on paraphrases for others, 
to the extent we bother thinking about them at all.  Despite how con-
ceptualism has, like formalism, acquired a bad name for itself among 
many legal commentators,30 concepts serve an economizing function, 
even though not all concepts serve this function equally well.  
 
27 See, e.g., Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d. 763, 766 (Ky. 1976) (relying on the doc-
trine of easement by estoppel to allow the use of a roadway, despite the owner’s right to 
exclude).  These exceptions generally arise in the context of more specific facts, so they 
are closer to the governance end of the spectrum of strategies for delineating property 
rights.  See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467-70 (2002) (discussing the spectrum of 
property rules with exclusion on one end and governance on the other).   
28 See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY:  VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 38-42 (2011) 
(critiquing the exclusionary conception of property for its failure to “bear[] any re-
semblance to the law of property as lawyers know it or, even more importantly, as citi-
zens experience it in everyday life”); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 747, 774 (2009) (calling the exclusionist 
account misleading and advocating an alternative theory centered on social obliga-
tions); see also Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 
940 (2010) (contrasting information theorists’ and progressive theorists’ stances on the 
importance of exclusion to the notion of property). 
29 See Henry E. Smith, Emergent Property, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY 
LAW (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., forthcoming 2013). 
30 See id. 
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II.  A COGNITIVE THEORY OF PROPERTY 
In this Part, I explore concepts and baselines in property, borrow-
ing some tools from cognitive science.  It may be no accident that the 
mind and the property system share these features.  For one thing, the 
property system is the product of human minds.  Further, I propose 
that the limits of the human mind and the property system both re-
flect a form of economizing in the face of complexity.  Both cognitive 
science and New Institutional Economics31 benefit from a very similar 
notion of economy and information cost.  Devices like decontextual-
ization, modularity, recursion, and the specific-over-general principle 
help the mind and the property system manage complexity.32  
One overarching hypothesis in cognitive science and, I would ar-
gue, implicitly also in the law and economics of property is that reduc-
tions in the information costs of using the system are reflected in the 
economy of description of that system.  Most types of (aspirationally) 
scientific theorizing place importance on shortness of description in 
some agreed upon metalanguage.33  A better theory, the argument 
goes, will capture known facts in a shorter description that simultaneously 
exposes the theory to counterevidence; the shortness of the description 
will correspond to a generality that makes claims about new cases. 
In this Part, I introduce a number of devices that have featured 
prominently in cognitive science and that can be applied to the archi-
tecture of property.  These include formal concepts and rules, the spe-
cific-over-general principle, modularity, and recursion.  Together they 
form part of an architecture of property law. 
 
31 See generally Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2090-101 (2009). 
32 Although it goes well beyond what I can demonstrate here, a larger question this 
thesis raises is whether both the mind and property law are pushed toward economiz-
ing on information by evolutionary pressures—that is, success in the environment in 
which each operates.  At least it would appear that many systems that manage complex-
ity this way are well adapted to their environments.  For examples in the field of eco-
nomics, see THE ELGAR COMPANION TO INSTITUTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY 
ECONOMICS (Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al. eds., 1994) and Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, 
Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950). 
33 See, e.g., BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE 87 (1980) (“When a theory 
is advocated, it is praised for many features other than empirical adequacy and 
strength:  it is said to be mathematically elegant, simple, of great scope, complete in 
certain respects:  also of wonderful use in unifying our account of hitherto disparate 
phenomena, and most of all, explanatory.” (first emphasis added)).  
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A.  Concepts and Rules 
We can now extend the discussion of the concepts and rules from 
the previous Part to a meta-level.  We have seen that more formal (de-
contextualized) concepts can be useful in operation and can save on 
information costs.  But concepts of law should not only generate the 
desired results but also reflect a general theory of the system.  Cogni-
tive science hypothesizes that shortness of description in an agreed 
upon meta-language corresponds to genuine generalizability.34  This 
idea has been highly influential in generative linguistics from the 
beginning:  the effort has been to align simplicity of description and 
explanatory power.35  As Chomsky put it when launching his research 
program, “We are not interested in reduction of the length of gram-
mars for its own sake.  Our aim is rather to permit just those reduc-
tions in length which reflect real simplicity . . . .”36  
Take a simple example from linguistics.  A grammar should cap-
ture, among other things, all the actual words of English.  But it also 
should capture accidental and systematic gaps.  Thus, “brick” is a word 
of English, but “blick” and “bnick” are not.  “Blick” is an accidental gap—
it is well-formed according to the best theory of English as reflected in the 
shortest grammar that captures this part of English.  By contrast, 
“bnick” should be systematically excluded.37  Experimental data on 
 
34 More technically, we are looking for the theory whose description can be gener-
ated by the shortest program in a binary language on a universal computer—the one 
with the least Kolmogorov complexity.  MING LI & PAUL VITÁNYI, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
KOLMOGOROV COMPLEXITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 319 (2d ed. 1997); see also JORMA 
RISSANEN, STOCHASTIC COMPLEXITY IN STATISTICAL INQUIRY 6-10, 79-92 (1989) (dis-
cussing Minimum Descriptive Length).  Interestingly, something like this idea is implicit 
in the work of the great Indian grammarian of the fourth century B.C., Pa– n. ini.  See Paul 
Kiparsky, Economy and the Construction of the Śivasūtras (“Economy requires making the 
list as short as possible, which means avoiding repetitions of sounds, and using as few 
markers as possible.”), in PA– N. INIAN STUDIES:  PROFESSOR S.D. JOSHI FELICITATION VOL-
UME 239, 240 (Madhav M. Deshpande & Saroja Bhate eds., 1991); Henry Smith, Brevity 
in Pa–n. ini, 20 J. INDIAN PHIL. 133, 136 (1992) (noting that, for Pa
– n. ini, “[b]revity seems 
to take precedence” in the statement of grammatical rules); see also Paul Kiparsky, 
Stanford Univ., Pa– n. ini’s Razor, Presentation at the Symposium on Sanskrit and Com-
putational Linguistics 14 (Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://www.stanford.edu/ 
~kiparsky/Papers/paris.pdf (linking the thoughts of Pa– n. ini to Kolmogorov com-
plexity). 
35 See, e.g., Morris Halle, Phonology in Generative Grammar, 18 WORD 54, 55-56 (1962) 
(applying a simplicity criterion to decide between expressions of a statement of genera-
tive grammar), reprinted in THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE 334, 335 ( Jerry A. Fodor & 
Jerrold J. Katz eds., 1964).  
36 NOAM CHOMSKY, THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF LINGUISTIC THEORY 118 (1975). 
37 This example is drawn from Noam Chomsky & Morris Halle, Some Controversial 
Questions in Phonological Theory, 1 J. LINGUISTICS 97, 101 (1965). 
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acceptability judgments back this up.38  Now consider two fragments of 
grammar.  In one, the rule makes consonants nonnasal (so no m’s or 
n’s) after consonants.39  In the other, which can be called the “blick 
rule,” the rule makes consonants nonlateral (not l) between b and ik.40  
The latter rule is not only longer41 but it saves less space in the lexicon:  
the “blick rule” covers just one case, but the other rule consolidates the 
lexicon corresponding to the systematic lack of nasals (m and n) fol-
lowing consonants. 
The cognitive theory of property views property law in a similar 
way.  Later I show that the longstanding controversies over baselines 
and exceptions in property can be seen in a different light if we pay 
attention to the potential shortness of a description produced by vari-
ous alternative sets of concepts and baselines in a meta-language.42 
B.  The Specific-over-General Principle 
Closely related to the criterion of simplicity in theorizing is the 
specific-over-general principle.  This principle allows for brevity to cap-
ture generalizations in a system of rules and is at the heart of cognitive 
architecture, especially the language faculty.  Any set of categories 
characterized (at least in part) by features can be described more 
briefly if common features can be factored out and applied by rule.  
We can conceptualize this as a “feature architecture,” in which specific 
categories, and ultimately individual types, inherit features from more 
general categories.  For example, verbs can take the past tense.  We 
need not note this for every verb’s entry in the mental lexicon.  Ra-
ther, all verbs inherit the feature “ability to take past tense.” 
 
38 The nature of the rules involved, if any, is a subtler question, because the reluc-
tance to accept an isolated sequence like bn- could be a statistical generalization from 
the lexicon or be based on analogy.  For discussion and some experimental evidence in 
favor of a version of structural rules, see Adam Albright & Bruce Hayes, Rules vs. Analogy 
in English Past Tenses:  A Computational/Experimental Study, 90 COGNITION 119 (2003).  
Grammaticality judgments have their limits as data but can be supplemented by data of 
relative preference of one unattested sequence over another, such as blick over bzick.  See 
generally CARSON T. SCHÜTZE, THE EMPIRICAL BASE OF LINGUISTICS:  GRAMMATICALITY 
JUDGMENTS AND LINGUISTIC METHODOLOGY (1996); Adam Albright, Natural Classes 
Are Not Enough (Oct. 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
web.mit.edu/albright/www/papers/Albright-BiasedGeneralization.pdf. 
39 Or, in one common notation:  C → [-nasal] / #C_. 
40 Or, C → [-lateral] / b_ik. 
41 That is, it is longer in terms of the length of the rule notation as shown supra, 
notes 39-40. 
42 See infra Sections III.A–B. 
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If a general rule and a specific rule can both potentially apply, the 
more specific one trumps the more general one.  A version of this 
principle holds in legal interpretation.43  It also plays a large role in 
artificial intelligence.44  The latter is partly the inspiration for cognitive 
science, and linguistics in particular, to build the specific-over-general 
principle into its models, which generally economize on rules.   
To return to our verb tense example, in English, past tense is gen-
erally formed with “-ed,” but some verbs take special past tense forms.45  
We have a general rule for forming the past tense with “-ed” and spe-
cific exceptions for small classes of verbs like “ring, rang” and even 
idiosyncratic forms like “be, was.”  The description is short, and it 
makes brevity correspond with generality.  And subject only to specific 
exceptions, it correctly predicts that new verbs will form the past with 
“-ed,” like “zing, zinged.”  
Combining the economizing function of concepts and rules with 
the specific-over-general principle exposes the commonality of some 
issues in evaluating alternative candidates for rules of a system.  In the 
past tense, there is little question which is the rule and which is the 
exception because the “-ed” ending is the most frequent and general-
izes the most easily.  Sometimes, however, things are not so simple.  In 
analyzing case marking in languages, we can come up with more and 
less specific rules; nevertheless, where multiple rules might apply, the 
specific one always wins.46  
 
43 John Manning dubs the principle that “the specific governs the general” the 
“specificity maxim.”  John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1939, 2012 (2011).  The principle is also well known in contractual inter-
pretation.  See, e.g., Smoot v. United States, 237 U.S. 38, 42 (1915) (Holmes, J.) (“In 
general, specific or individual marks prevail over generic ones.”); DCV Holdings, Inc. v. 
Conagra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 961 (Del. 2005) (“Specific language in a contract controls 
over general language, and where specific and general provisions conflict, the specific 
provision ordinarily qualifies the meaning of the general one.”). 
44 See, e.g., JOHN H. HOLLAND ET AL., INDUCTION:  PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, LEARN-
ING, AND DISCOVERY 18-19 (1989) (discussing the use of default hierarchies in a 
knowledge structure and providing examples of how defaults avoid overwhelming a 
computational system); Marco Dorigo, New Perspectives About Default Hierarchies Formation 
in Learning Classifier Systems (noting that “default hierarchies” allow models to be built 
with fewer total rules), in TRENDS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:  2ND CONGRESS OF THE 
ITALIAN ASSOCIATION FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 218, 221-22 (Edoardo Ardizzone et 
al. eds., 1991). 
45 This is the central example in STEVEN PINKER, WORDS AND RULES:  THE INGRE-
DIENTS OF LANGUAGE 13-19 (1999). 
46 Case marking is a dramatic example in linguistics of a phenomenon that can be 
modeled with nested default rules.  HENRY SMITH, RESTRICTIVENESS IN CASE THEORY 
(1996).  Thus, Modern English, with very little case, could be analyzed as having the 
nominative case as the default case.  It is used for subjects (She runs) and for apposition 
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The specific-over-general principle allows for economy of descrip-
tion and explanatory generalization to new cases.  In particular, the 
most general default rule (such as the past tense “-ed” rule in English) 
should capture the most heterogeneous, “left over” (or “elsewhere” or 
“otherwise”) distribution of instances.  Capturing a heterogeneous 
“elsewhere” distribution with the most general (least restrictive) default 
is the most economical approach.47   
As we will see, similar questions arise in property law, such as 
whether nemo dat is the rule and the good faith purchaser is the excep-
tion, or vice versa.48  The cognitive theory of property suggests that sim-
plicity of description at the level of theory will help answer this question. 
C.  Managing Complexity with Modularity 
Property concepts and categories manage the complexity of inter-
actions between actors over the use of resources.  Building on Herbert 
Simon’s work on the architecture of complexity and near decomposa-
bility (modularity),49 I will show how hierarchy and redundancy allow 
property to solve the problem of multiparty interactions over resource 
use.  To allow for the capacity to evolve, and for ease of understand-
ing, systems ranging from architecture50 to language51 tend to be hier-
archical and are founded on highly generative building blocks.  
 
(It is he).  The objective case is more specific, being used for objects of verbs and prepo-
sitions (The dog bites him, The cat is with her).  The point is that case marking can be cap-
tured by a theory that posits rules of varying generality where the specific rule trumps 
more general ones in environments where more than one rule might apply.  A telling 
controversy arose in the nineteenth century about how to analyze the accusative case in 
Vedic Sanskrit.  Carl Gaedicke analyzed it as serving no particular function other than 
capturing functions not fulfilled by other cases.  See CARL GAEDICKE, DER ACCUSATIV IM 
VEDA 22, 52-181 (Breslau, Verlag von Wilhelm Koebner 1880) (presenting the accusa-
tive case as the default case in Vedic Sanskrit).  William Dwight Whitney, meanwhile, 
objected to defining the accusative as the default case, arguing that such a moniker 
could apply to any case.  W.D. Whitney, On Delbrück’s Vedic Syntax, 13 AM. J. PHILOLOGY 
271, 285-86 (1892).  Whitney is technically correct, but not all such formulations would 
be equally simple—that is, short—in the agreed-upon meta-language.  See SMITH,  
supra, at 39-40. 
47 SMITH, supra note 46, at 40, 84-86. 
48 See infra Section III.A. 
49 See Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 
467, 477 (1962) (“The fact . . . that many complex systems have a nearly decomposable, 
hierarchic structure is a major facilitating factor enabling us to understand, to describe, 
and even to ‘see’ such systems and their parts.”). 
50 See generally CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE:  TOWNS, 
BUILDINGS, CONSTRUCTION (1977) (outlining various “patterns” of livability to illumi-
nate potential solutions to various social problems).  
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1.  Varieties of Modularity 
Property theory can draw on other fields that have employed 
modularity theory to explain how systems manage complexity.  Modu-
larity has been fruitful but also quite controversial in cognitive sci-
ence.52  In 1983, Jerry Fodor suggested that the mind is modular. 53  For 
him, a modular component of mind was domain specific, autono-
mous, automatic, encapsulated, and hardwired.54  Vision served as a 
prototypical example:  the brain achieves vision in a speedy, involun-
tary manner, using dedicated structures whose processes are largely 
immune from correction, despite other information the mind possesses.55  
In the years since, many theorists have taken issue with modularity as a 
general architecture of the mind, citing mental capacities that lack 
one or more of Fodor’s list of features.56  The remaining alternative is 
often thought to be a general processing model, under which the 
mind and its processes theoretically have access to all types of infor-
mation (so no encapsulation).57  In a sense, this type of model is simi-
lar to the Realist picture of property based on the bundle of rights:  
all information is in principle accessible to any part of the system all 
the time. 
Recently, a more modest version of modularity has gained traction 
as an alternative to the general processing model.  New modularity 
 
51 Cf. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 24 (1957) (discussing the hierarchy 
that any linguistic theory requires).  
52 See, e.g., William Marslen-Wilson & Lorraine Komisarjevsky Tyler, Against Modu-
larity (rejecting the understanding of “special properties of language” as a distinct 
“module” and arguing for the inclusion of inferences deriving from “nonlinguistic 
knowledge”), in MODULARITY IN KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION AND NATURAL-
LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 37, 58 ( Jay L. Garfield ed., 1991).  
53 JERRY A. FODOR, THE MODULARITY OF MIND 37 (1983). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 48. 
56 See, e.g., WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY:  THE LIMITS OF LOCALIZING 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 89-146 (2001) (noting difficulties with the argu-
ment that cognitive functions may be localized in particular parts of the brain); David J. 
Buller, Get Over:  Massive Modularity, 20 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 881, 885 (2005) (reviewing 
EVOLUTION AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING:  THE DEBATE (David E. Over ed., 
2003)) (suggesting that the massive modularity hypothesis may not be “a theoretically 
viable hypothesis about the structure of the mind.”).  In some sense, even Fodor is in 
this camp.  See generally FODOR, supra note 53, at 38 (noting that modularity may be 
limited to specific parts of the mind). 
57 UTTAL, supra note 56, at 218-19 (suggesting a model that views “behavior in terms 
of the overall, unitary, integrated activity”).  
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theory is based on functional specialization, not spatial definition.58  
Rather than positing a unitary self, one version of the theory divides 
the mind into modules relating to seeking food and sex, which com-
pete with self-control and moral modules; at the same time, a separate 
module from those restraining one’s own behavior judges others irre-
spective of the first modules’ success (hence the hypocrisy).59   
Now consider modularity theory as applied in the organizational 
literature.  Organizations share many features and purposes with prop-
erty.  In a sense they are property—what might be termed “entity 
property.”60  The organizational literature using modularity starts with 
the interactions of transactors as a complex system.61  A complex sys-
tem is one in which internal interactions are so numerous and dense 
that is it difficult to infer the properties of the whole from the proper-
ties of its parts.62  It is a system in which any change to an element of 
the system might affect any other element or combination of elements 
directly or indirectly.  In a fully interconnected system, ripple effects 
make change so unpredictable that change may not even be an op-
tion.  The choice, in other words, is between near-chaos and rigidity.63   
One way out of this bind is to break up the system into semi-
autonomous components (modules).  Modularization depends on the 
 
58 For an accessible introduction to modularity in cognitive theory that argues that 
evolution only acts to connect modules if it leads to better functioning, see ROBERT 
KURZBAN, WHY EVERYONE (ELSE) IS A HYPOCRITE:  EVOLUTION AND THE MODULAR MIND 
50 (2010).  For an argument that although modules are rigid the mind can be flexible, 
see Dan Sperber, Modularity and Relevance:  How Can a Massively Modular Mind Be Flexible 
and Context-Sensitive?, in THE INNATE MIND:  STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 53, 57 (Peter 
Carruthers et al. eds., 2005). 
59 See KURZBAN, supra note 58, at 159-60, 203-05, 214-17. 
60 See generally THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 684-829 (2007) (discussing entity property). 
61 See generally 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES (2000) (charac-
terizing complex systems and changes as ultimately composed of simpler ones); MANAG-
ING IN THE MODULAR AGE:  ARCHITECTURES, NETWORKS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (Raghu 
Garud et al. eds., 2003) (exploring and comparing modularity in technology and or-
ganizational settings); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 19, 32-34 (2002) (noting increased modularity in American 
industries, such as the automobile industry); Ron Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modu-
larity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in Product and Organization Design, 17 STRA-
TEGIC MGMT. J. 63, 64 (1996) (analyzing product design and organizational processes 
for developing products through the prism of the structural conception of hierarchy in 
complex systems). 
62 Simon, supra note 49, at 468. 
63 See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 61, at 58-59, 236-37, 257. 
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system being what Herbert Simon termed “nearly decomposable.”64  A 
nearly decomposable system consists of a pattern of interactions such 
that module boundaries can be drawn so that interactions are intense 
within the module but sparse and constrained between modules.65  
This system allows for information hiding:  decisions and innovations 
in one module can progress largely without regard to what is happen-
ing in other modules, with satisfaction of the interface conditions serv-
ing as the only constraint.  
One function of institutions, from business organizations, to bureau-
cracies, to communities, is to manage the complexity of aggregating 
information.  In a sense, organizations face the same problem as the 
mind:  how to aggregate and process information.  The New Institu-
tional Economics points to the importance of many institutions for 
managing information in market exchange.66   
Markets have a strongly modular flavor.  On Adam Smith’s account, 
each actor only needs to consult his self-interest against the back-
ground of the market and will be guided as if by an invisible hand 
towards actions that contribute to efficiency.67  The informational 
responsibility of each actor is limited and local.  Likewise, Hayek’s 
theory of markets as devices for processing information partakes of 
modularity.68  Each market actor possesses a variety of local knowledge 
about his own uses of resources, but need only consult prices and the 
general “rules of the game” in order to make economizing decisions 
about acquiring and using those resources.  The information that each 
actor uses can impact prices, but no other actor needs to know that 
information.  The prices and the rules are the interface conditions 
among market participants and allow other information to be hidden.  
By contrast, a central planner is nonmodular and is expected to gather 
and act on all this information without necessarily ruling out any in-
teraction among pieces of information.  
 
64 Id. at 474-75; see also BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 61, at 252 (“The essential as-
pect of modularity lies in the fact that . . . [t]asks within different modules can . . . pro-
ceed independently.”).   
65 Simon, supra note 49, at 474. 
66 See Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 
27, 40-42 (1982) (highlighting the role of various institutional actors in overcoming the 
challenge of measuring asset values in a complex market system). 
67 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776). 
68 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524-26 
(1945) (arguing that markets enable the employment of widely dispersed information). 
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This Article suggests that modularity is a characteristic of one of 
the institutions supporting a wide range of market and nonmarket 
interactions:  the law of property.  Property law manages complexity 
through modularity.  The exclusion strategy is the starting point in 
property, and this strategy economizes on information costs.  By set-
ting up cheap and rough proxies like boundary crossings, property law 
can indirectly protect a wide range of largely unspecified interests in 
use, the details of which are of no particular relevance to those under 
a duty to respect the right (in this case, by not crossing boundaries 
without the permission of the owner).  The basic (rebuttable) presump-
tion in property law is delegation to the owner through the right to 
exclude, which serves to economize on information costs.69  In effect, 
the exclusion strategy allows the property system to manage the com-
plexity of resources uses through modularity, with much information 
hidden in property modules.  In trespass to land, an unauthorized 
crossing of a boundary serves as a (very) rough proxy for harmful use; 
any voluntary entry into the space defined by the ad coelum rule counts 
as a trespass.70  “Keep out” usually means keep out.  Likewise in personal 
 
69 See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1767 
(2004) (“[T]he use of exclusion together with a property rule sweeps a broad class of 
uses into the definition of the entitlement.”).  This theory differs from those that see 
the right to exclude as the sine qua non of property.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2066 (2012) (“[T]he owner’s right to exclude 
is a necessary condition of identifying something as being property.”).  It also differs 
in emphasis from theories that posit a necessarily tighter connection between the 
mechanism of delineation and the interests in use.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 61 (1985) (“Linking 
rights of possession, use, and disposition into a single bundle of rights offers powerful 
utilitarian advantages.”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 275, 290 (2008) (“Ownership’s defining characteristic is that it is the 
special authority to set the agenda for a resource.”); Adam Mossoff, What is Property?  
Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 397-403 (2003) (noting the central-
ity of possessory rights, such as exclusion, use, enjoyment, and alienation, to the con-
cept of property). 
70 The full statement of the maxim is cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad in-
feros (“he who owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths”).  The maxim is 
routinely followed in resolving issues about ownership of air rights, building en-
croachments, overhanging tree limbs, mineral rights, and so forth, and is subject to 
certain limited exceptions, for example, for airplane overflights.  See Brown v. United 
States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that “the advent of human 
flight” justifies an exception to the common law rule); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY 
E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW:  PROPERTY 31-32, 57-58 (2010) 
(reviewing the principle of, and modern exceptions to, ad coelum); Henry E. Smith, 
Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 992 (2004) (noting 
the heavier reliance of the law of trespass on the physical boundaries of parcels, as de-
fined by the ad coelum rule, as compared to the law of nuisance).  
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property, I know not to take a car from a parking lot if it is not mine 
and I do not have the owner’s permission; I need not know anything 
about the identity of the owner, nor whether the car is subject to a 
security interest or the subject of a bailment.71  Thus, to the nonowner, 
property is like a black box, a module where the type of use is simply 
irrelevant to the duty of abstention.   
Only in specialized contexts does the law start inquiring into uses 
more directly, as where one landowner is annoying another with 
odors.  In this case, rules of nuisance law implement a governance 
strategy that can be thought of as the interface between adjacent bun-
dles of rights.  But it is the exclusion factor that keeps the bundles 
lumpy, opaque, and operating as modules in which interactions and 
interdependencies are intense inside but sparse outside the individual 
property.  As a result, actions within a module do not have hard-to-
predict ripple effects through the entire system.  On the information-
cost theory, the combination of exclusion and governance in property 
furnishes modules and interfaces for actors taking potentially conflicting 
actions with respect to resources.72 
The exclusionary strategy is not the only source of formal modular 
concepts in property.  Paralleling the recent debates over modularity 
in cognitive science,73 we can expand the concept of modularity from 
spatial notions, like the definition of a parcel of land or an object of 
personal property, to intangibles.  Various aspects of property law 
operate as semiautonomous components, which are not fully transpar-
ent to each other and not fully responsive to contextual information.74  
Often these aspects of property are associated with traditional con-
cepts and baselines.  Later I will show how traditional and familiar 
baselines like the principle of nemo dat and concepts like title—which 
are often devalued on a Realist framework—can be seen as managing 
complexity through formalism.75  These traditional concepts and base-
lines are functional modules of the system of property law. 
 
71 See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 75-76 (1997). 
72 Cf. Smith, supra note 27, at S468-69 (noting the need for mixed strategies of 
property delineation where resources are shared among multiple claimants); Henry 
E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:  Delineating Entitlement in Information, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1742, 1806-07 (2007) (noting the parallel concepts in use in intellectual property law). 
73 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
74 See infra Sections III.A–B. 
75 See infra Section III.A. 
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2.  Nonmodularity as a Theoretical Baseline 
The functional modules of property law are easier to understand 
against a theoretical baseline of full nonmodularity.  The Realists’ 
rhetoric often sounded in themes about how property law concepts 
(mis)lead one into a “heaven of legal concepts”76 and “transcendental 
nonsense.”77  There is some irony in this, because assuming that law 
can be fully contextualized in an extreme version of the bundle of 
sticks leads to an otherworldly place where a Hohfeldian or “Coasean” 
baseline is unrealistically substituted for our reality.  By taking concepts 
and modularity seriously, we can avoid this trap.   
Property modules allow for bundling that is not captured by simply 
regarding a bundle as the mere sum of its constituents.  In property, 
the exclusion strategy results in property’s being not just a bundle of 
sticks but something more that high transaction costs prevent us from 
fully achieving by contract.  Property functions in part as a shortcut over 
all the regulations or bilateral contracts that would have to be devised to 
govern all members of society in all their interactions.78 As has been 
the case in cognitive science, and linguistics in particular, a modular 
system turns out to be easier to describe in an economical fashion.   
What we still need is a theory of which modules and interfaces are 
(and should be) chosen and how decentralized the modularization of 
the system should be.  Work on community structure and optimal 
modularization can be a source of testable hypotheses.  In particular, the 
application of network theory, community structure, and the notion of 
the strength of ties in social networks is well-established.79  These 
 
76 The Realists were fans of von Jhering’s sarcastic dismissal of Savigny’s legal meta-
physics as a “heaven of legal concepts.”  Rudolf von Jhering, In the Heaven of Legal Con-
cepts, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 678, 679 (Morris R. Co-
Cohen & Felix S. Cohen eds., Edith Lowenstein trans., 1951). 
77 Cohen, supra note 22. 
78 In similar fashion, a firm is a nexus of contracts, but the firm has special modular 
bundling features that are only achievable by contract under the property-like aspect of 
organizational law.  The asset-partitioning theory of the firm can be interpreted as an 
example of using modularity to manage complexity.  Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (argu-
ing that asset-partitioning is not achievable by contract, making it the “essential role” of 
organizational law). 
79 See, e.g., Aaron Clauset et al., Finding Community Structure in Very Large Networks, 70 
PHYSICAL REV. E 066111-1 (2004) (determining community structure within a network 
based on Amazon.com purchase data); M.E.J. Newman, Modularity and Community Struc-
ture in Networks, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8577, 8578-79 (2006) (proposing a modu-
larity matrix for community detection); Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in 
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theories, along with the organizational modularity literature, can draw 
on general modularity theory.  These implications I leave for further 
work, but modularity theory provides some hypotheses about the 
tradeoffs and some directions for empirical inquiry. 
D.  Recursion and Generativity 
Recursion—the ability of a rule or rules to feed themselves—
achieves dramatic savings on information costs.80  Recursion has been 
central to generative linguistics,81 and it should be to a cognitive theory 
of property as well. 
The following is a recursive rule:  A → AB, or “Rewrite A as AB.”  A 
appears on both sides of the arrow.  So starting with A, we get AB by 
one application of the rule, ABB by another application of the rule, 
ABBB by a third application of the rule, and so on.  Starting with a set 
of inputs that includes A, we can generate an infinite set of outputs. 
Recursion helps generative grammar employ finite grammars to 
capture the open-endedness of the set of sentences of a language.82  
The set of English sentences is infinite in principle.  Natural languages 
tend to contain structures like “that”-clauses that seem to call for recur-
sion in syntax.  The sentence, “Chris said that Kim was sick,” exhibits 
 
Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 24-34 (2009) (discussing the importance of 
strong ties in effective custom-based property law). 
80 For an engaging introduction that describes recursion through real-life exam-
ples, see DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH:  AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 
127-57 (1979).  For another introduction, see generally JOSEPH R. SHOENFIELD, RECUR-
SION THEORY (1993). 
81 See, e.g., Marc D. Hauser, Noam Chomsky, & W. Tecumseh Fitch, The Faculty of 
Language:  What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?, 298 SCIENCE 1569, 1577 (2002) 
(“It is a foundational observation of modern generative linguistics that, to capture nat-
ural language, a grammar must include [a capacity for recursion].”); Steven Pinker & 
Ray Jackendoff, The Faculty of Language:  What’s Special About It?, 95 COGNITION 201 
(2005) (explaining the role of recursion in language).  But see Daniel L. Everett, Cultural 
Constraints on Grammar and Cognition in Pirahã:  Another Look at the Design Features of Hu-
man Language, 46 CURRENT ANTHRO. 621 (2005) (questioning recursion’s centrality in 
linguistics by way of an example language that lacks it).  See generally RECURSION AND 
HUMAN LANGUAGE (Harry van der Hulst ed., 2010). 
82 The need for recursion in syntax and the creativeness of language is a loose and 
suggestive relationship, contrary to a common assumption among linguists.  See Geoffrey 
K. Pullum & Barbara C. Scholz, Recursion and the Infinitude Claim, in RECURSION AND HU-
MAN LANGUAGE, supra note 81, at 113, 118-24 (refuting the “Standard Argument”).  
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embedding, but can be embedded again as in “Pat believed that Chris 
said that Kim was sick,” and on and on.83 
Something similar allows for a small number of basic property 
forms to achieve complex ends.  Thus, the rule carving a remainder 
out of an interest is recursive.84   
(i)  Fee simple  →  Life estate + Reversion 
(ii)  Reversion  →  Life estate + Reversion 
Notice that in (ii) “Reversion” appears on both sides of the arrow:  the 
rule can feed itself.  Thus, we can break a fee simple into a life estate 
plus a reversion (by (i)):  O to A for life (then to O).  And then we can 
break the reversion into another life estate plus a reversion, pushing 
back the first reversion, by applying (ii):  O to A for life, then to B for 
life (then to O).  We can now apply (ii) again:  O to A for life, then to 
B for life, then to C for life (then to O).  We can do this as many times 
as we like.  Other examples include trusts (and trusts of trusts, trusts of 
trusts of trusts, etc.) and other layers of ownership (nested corporate 
subsidiaries, for example).  Recursion lets one analogize the basic 
forms of property to Lego-like building blocks.  Legos combine with 
each other in generative ways and complexes of blocks can combine 
further in just the ways simpler ones do.   
E.  Towards an Architecture of Property 
The foregoing devices work in tandem to economize on infor-
mation costs, as reflected also in the shortness of a description in an 
appropriate meta-language.  Ultimately though, whether a cognitive 
theory of property can succeed will depend on its application.  Before 
examining its application, note one phenomenon that many modular 
systems exhibit:  the convergence of static and process explanations.  
Modular systems evolve easily.  As a result, some psychologists hypothe-
size that the system of conflicting modules—within which specific rules 
trump general ones and modules have different strengths in different 
 
83 See, e.g., IVAN A. SAG & THOMAS WASOW, SYNTACTIC THEORY:  A FORMAL INTRO-
DUCTION 36, 259 (1999) (describing the recursion of prepositional phrases and that-
clauses). 
84 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 60, at 576-77; see also MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 
70, at 105 (describing the “generative quality” of life estates and remainder interests in 
property); Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law (“Property rights can be 
standardized because they combine recursively . . . .”), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 148, 152-53 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). 
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contexts—may reflect the evolution of the system.85  Because they are 
detachable, modules can be added and subtracted in response to pres-
sures of evolution.  As Herbert Simon recognized decades ago, nearly 
decomposable systems tend to be susceptible to congruent static and 
process descriptions because processes come to effectively reach a de-
sired state of affairs.86  Very roughly, ontogeny really does recapitulate 
phylogeny in these kinds of systems.87 
I suggest that something similar is true of property law.  Some of 
the baseline rules like nemo dat and ad coelum have over time been sub-
ject to exceptions, and for reasons of economizing, a static description 
still makes sense.  Nemo dat and ad coelum remain the basic default rules 
subject to exceptions like the good faith purchaser to nemo dat and 
airplane overflights to ad coelum.  It is to these applications of the cog-
nitive theory of property to which we now turn. 
III.  APPLICATIONS 
A cognitive theory of property can capture many aspects of property 
involving baselines and exceptions.  The point is that the cognitive 
theory allows for a real theory and an elegant one at that—a brief and 
rigorous description, whose brevity corresponds to true generalization.  
At the same time, the cognitive theory of property suggests why base-
lines are important and robust, in a fashion that is hard to capture on 
the bundle-of-rights picture.  The power of the cognitive theory can be 
illustrated, as we have seen, with the structure of trespass and its limita-
tions and qualifications.  Here, I focus on nemo dat, title, and the law-
versus-equity distinction. 
A.  Nemo Dat and Other Baselines 
Consider first the rule of nemo dat quod non habet, or “one cannot 
give that which one does not have.”  If A transfers to B, and then A 
purports to transfer to C, B has better title than C.  At the time A trans-
ferred to B, A had something to transfer.  When it comes time that A 
tries to transfer to C, A has nothing to transfer.  It sounds like common 
sense, and it is.  One could imagine all sorts of different rules, based 
on the relative qualities of B and C, to determine who had the better 
 
85 See, e.g., KURZBAN, supra note 58, at 65 (noting that modules evolve over time to 
fit different situations). 
86 Simon, supra note 49, at 479-80. 
87 Id. at 480. 
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title—their virtue, their need, and so on—but nemo dat is a highly for-
mal rule, relatively invariant to context. 
In practice, exceptions to nemo dat apply often, if not most of the 
time.  In the case of land, recording statutes govern the question of 
whether a good faith purchaser for value can acquire good title from a 
seller with no title.88  Generally the answer is yes, provided the later 
purchaser (the person in C’s position) has no notice (and, in many 
jurisdictions, also records before the competing claimant).89  The land 
records furnish constructive notice, so that good faith is only possible 
if the land is unrecorded.   
Which is the baseline case, nemo dat or the good faith exception?  
One could describe the situation as later purchasers winning except 
when they do not acquire for value or have notice (or, in some juris-
dictions, fail to record first)—or if the recording act does not apply 
(e.g., wild deeds and early or late recorded deeds).  The question is 
which baseline provides a simpler way to describe the law. 
Personal property is another area featuring nemo dat and the good 
faith exception.  Legal systems have a wider or narrower good faith 
exception to nemo dat for personal property turning often on the void–
voidable distinction (a good faith purchaser can gain good title from 
someone with voidable title, as in cases of fraud, but not from some-
one like a thief, with void title).90  Usually, the broad version of the 
good faith purchaser exception depends on lack of notice or some 
form of it.  The market overt rule is one example of an implicitly notice-
based exception to nemo dat in favor of good-faith purchasers.91  
 
88 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.10 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). 
89 Id. 
90 See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2011) (“A person with voidable title has power to transfer 
a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.”). 
91 The market overt rule allows a good faith purchaser to beat the original title 
holder, even with a thief in the chain of title, if the purchaser bought in an open mar-
ket, (i.e., from a merchant dealer openly displaying the goods).  See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. 
CIV.] art. 2277 (Fr.) (requiring the original owner to pay the purchaser the purchase 
price to regain item the item if bought in open market), translation available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/Code_
22.pdf (listed in translation at art. 2280); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL 
CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, as amended, § 935, para. 2 (Ger.) (allowing someone that pur-
chases an item at public auction to retain ownership even if the item was stolen), trans-
lation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html.  
The French and German rules are broader than the American rule, which requires that 
the original owner have entrusted the goods to a merchant dealing in “goods of that 
kind.”  U.C.C. § 2-403(2); see also id. (“Any entrusting of possession of goods to a mer-
chant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the 
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.”).  For a summary of various 
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This heterogeneous set of circumstances is easier to describe as a 
set of exceptions to nemo dat than as a set of freestanding rules with a 
freestanding nemo dat rule alongside them.  The hypothesis advanced 
here is that a description of the system with good faith purchaser and 
various other exceptions as specific exceptions, and the nemo dat rule 
as the general rule, will be shorter in an agreed-upon meta-language 
than one with nemo dat as an exception to some other general rule.  
This is because the good faith purchaser exception—or set of excep-
tions—can be described relatively simply, leaving nemo dat to be de-
fined implicitly at low cost.  By contrast, all the (on the traditional 
account, interstitial) applications of nemo dat as an exception would 
require lengthy descriptions—the intricacies of good faith purchase, 
wild deeds, etc.—unaided by the generality of good faith purchase as a 
unitary rule.   
Whether using nemo dat as a baseline provides for a simpler de-
scription of the system is an empirical question.  But the cognitive 
theory here can explain a striking fact:  all systems, despite their diver-
sity in which exceptions they allow, treat nemo dat as the baseline case.92  
I would go further and claim that any rigorous descriptions of a sys-
tem—even ones like German civil law with a broad good faith excep-
tion93—will find it more convenient to treat nemo dat as the baseline.  
One could regard this as a matter of history, but experience has been 
that the system is easier to understand with nemo dat as the baseline.94  
This may be an example in which, as Simon noted, state and process 
descriptions converge—ontogeny replicates phylogeny.95 
Again, what no system seems to do is to make good faith purchaser 
the rule and nemo dat the exception.96  This is not a statement about 
the relative frequency of the application of the baseline rule or the 
exception, and it is certainly not a moral evaluation of nemo dat title-
holders and good faith purchasers.  It is simply an explanation of the 
 
jurisdictions’ approaches to this question, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethink-
ing the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1378, 1380, 1382 (2011). 
92 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 91, at 1378, 1380, 1382 (tabulating countries 
adopting nemo dat as a base principle). 
93 See BGB, supra note 91, §§ 932, 935. 
94 This has been the author’s experience, and it is reflected in the treatment of title 
records and the transfer of property in MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 60, at 884-936. 
95 See Simon, supra note 49, at 480-81. 
96 For a survey of ancient and modern treatment of the good faith purchaser rule, 
see Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 43, 49-65 (1987). 
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pattern of delineation based on relative costs.  The point is not that nemo 
dat is numerically important or morally worthy, but that it covers a 
heterogeneous set of circumstances that reflect its being the general 
baseline, however compromised it may be in practice. 
This pattern of nested defaults holds for exclusion and governance.  
Why is exclusion the baseline for delineation purposes?  Because it is 
the general case, and governance is special.  Exclusion and govern-
ance are methods of delineation that are arrayed along a spectrum of 
more use-neutral to more use-specific.  The characteristics of resource 
uses and their users are suppressed in the interests of formalism and 
modularity—more in the case of exclusion than governance.  Again, 
this has no bearing on whether exclusion is the moral “core” of prop-
erty, or whether it corresponds to an interest at all.97  Rather, it is 
cheaper to delineate from the general case, with adjustments for im-
portant matters, than to jump in and start delineating at a specific lev-
el and hope the outcome will be the same (extensionally).  As in many 
instances of cognitive architecture, particularly when it comes to con-
cepts and categories, the specific overrides the general to economize 
on mental resources.98 
One might make a similar point about other baselines, like the ad 
coelum rule.  Here, the residual case of ownership within the column of 
space can be overridden on a presumptive basis.  When an important 
issue like airplane overflights comes along, the presumptive ownership 
can be overcome.99  Whether one thinks that the ad coelum rule literally 
described true ownership to the heavens and was overridden in the 
interests of high altitude overflights, or whether one regards the tradi-
tional formulation as a loose and convenient one that needed disam-
biguating in the face of a new problem, the ad coelum rule was and, 
despite dictum to the contrary,100 continues to be an important base-
line governing building air rights, overhanging eaves, and the like.  
Here again we can witness the state and process description—with ad 
coelum as a strong but only presumptive default—converging. 
 
97 See Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap:  The Indirect Relation Between Ends and 
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 963-65 (2009) (arguing that 
property serves interests in use indirectly through exclusion and more directly through 
governance such that conceptualizing property as based in exclusion with various ex-
ceptions does not diminish the importance of the exceptions). 
98 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
99 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 60, at 9-15, 175-83 (providing and discussing 
examples of exceptions to the ad coelum rule). 
100 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“[The ad coelum] doctrine 
has no place in the modern world . . . .”). 
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Interestingly, the value of a simple uniform concept may also hold 
true for the much-maligned notion of title, where property intersects 
with commercial law.  Karl Llewellyn believed that concepts had to 
prove their worth in terms of real world concepts (which made him a 
moderate anticonceptualist).  He believed that the older sales-act ap-
proach of asking in transactions who had title (to answer questions 
about default risk allocation and remedies, among other things), was 
unjustified overconceptualism.101  In drafting the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Llewellyn set out to diminish the importance of title, a decision 
fully justified according to the Realist-inspired conventional wisdom.  
Yet even for Llewellyn, title retained some use:  he conceded that “it 
should be made to serve merely as the general residuary clause.”102  
Indeed, having a simple concept that one can plug into various con-
texts and that requires little special tailoring has a complexity-
managing virtue that should make it presumptively usable until the 
utility of a tailored concept in a particular situation-type clears some 
higher threshold.  What exactly that threshold should be is difficult to 
say, but it is far from clear that an exact answer to such questions is 
needed in order to make a system of presumptive modular concepts 
like title useful. 
Beyond the scope of this Article are similar questions that can now 
be framed with respect to a wide range of concepts and baselines in 
property.  Other questions that might be asked and that the cognitive 
approach might help answer are:  Why is the fee simple the “basic” 
interest?  Why do we have a law of property instead of laws relating to 
particular resources?  In each case, simplicity and the convergence of 
state and process descriptions help explain why property employs the 
baselines it does, and why departure from these baselines is harder 
than it would seem. 
B.  Law Versus Equity 
I have argued in other work that equity supplies “a safety valve” in 
order to discourage opportunistic misuse of legal rules.103  But how do 
 
101 See K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 
159, 169 (1938) (“[Title] remains, in the Sales field, an alien lump, undigested.”). 
102 Id. at 170. 
103 Henry E. Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1047, 1050 (2011); see also Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 
17-18 (May 30, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Smith, Law Versus Equity] (showing “that equity is a coherent mode of decision making 
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we know that equity is the exception and law the baseline?  For one 
thing, courts and commentators say so,104 and so state the old jurisdic-
tional rules, by which equity was supposed to apply only when the legal 
remedy was inadequate and such that it did not disturb legal property 
rights.105  Many suspected that this prescribed separation did not describe 
reality.106  But what would a world of mostly equity and exceptional law 
look like?  It would be very uncertain and expensive to apply.  As we 
will see, this is especially so if we assume that most actors are not op-
portunistic.  In such a world, the rules of thumb for when equity ap-
plies—continuing trespass and the like, and the exceptions to the 
exceptions, such as for bad faith—would be harder to describe.  In 
general, it is easier to describe—and to navigate—a system of simple 
rules backed up by a no-misuse principle than it would be to specify 
the methods of misuse (or even its outer contours) and then treat 
non-misuse as an exception. 
This specific-over-general architecture can exhibit multiple levels, 
with nested presumptive rules.  Consider building encroachments.107  
 
in which features work together to combat opportunistic behavior that undermines the 
modular structures of the common law”). 
104 See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 19 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1929) 
(“Equity was not a self-sufficient system, at every point it presupposed the existence of 
common law.  Common law was a self-sufficient system . . . . Equity without common 
law would have been a castle in the air, an impossibility.”). 
105 See, e.g., Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co., 73 S.E. 82, 83 (W. Va. 1911) (noting 
that the “chief restraint” on a court’s revisiting a legal rule is that it not “disturb[] 
property rights”); Charles M. Gray, The Boundaries of the Equitable Function, 20 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 192, 202-06 (1976) (illustrating how courts of equity were supposed to 
refrain from declaring property rights). 
106 Common law lawyers were always skeptical that equity could be cabined, as fa-
mously captured by Selden’s quip about the Chancellor’s foot: 
Equity is a Roguish thing, for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to, 
Equity is according to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is 
larger or narrower, so is Equity.  ’Tis all one as if they should make the Stand-
ard for the measure, a Chancellors Foot, what an uncertain measure would this 
be?  One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a Third an indif-
ferent Foot:  ’Tis the same thing in the Chancellors Conscience. 
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK:  BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 18 (London, 
E. Smith 1689).  Recently, Douglas Laycock has argued that the irreparable injury rule 
presents no constraint on the issuance of injunctions.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE 
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 106 (1991) (“[C]ourts do not deny specific 
relief because of the irreparable injury rule alone.  There is always another reason.”). 
107 See Smith, Law Versus Equity, supra note 103, at 14-15 (discussing equity’s ability 
to “soften the remedy” in specific cases to avoid socially wasteful behavior).  Part of 
the problem is the modern lack of understanding of the undue hardship defense.  See 
generally Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal 
Train Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L., no. 3, 2012, at 1, 4-5 
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This area of the law is often taken to be unpredictable,108 but the gen-
eral contours are not mysterious once equity is recognized as the safety 
valve it is.  The general rule is that equity will not enjoin a trespass, but 
for continuing trespasses equity will presume irreparable injury and 
generally afford an injunction.109  A building encroachment, then, 
might be a candidate for an injunction.  A good faith encroachment, 
for which an injunction would cause undue (or disproportionate) 
hardship, can, however, be remedied by the payment of damages.110  
Bad faith encroachers, on the other hand, cannot avail themselves of 
this good faith exception and so are subject to injunctions.111  This 
nested set of presumptions and exceptions is easy to describe.  It may 
well be that most encroachments are in good faith.  But a system that took 
that as the base case and made exceptions for bad faith and for situations 
of continuing trespass without hardship would receive a less elegant 
description.   
The cognitive approach can show how viewing equity as an excep-
tion aimed at discouraging opportunism provides a unified explana-
tion of the equitable tradition.  Equity courts and commentators going 
back to Christopher St. German112 invoked Aristotle’s notions of equity, 
in which equity corrects “law where law is defective because of its gen-
erality.”113  One reason law can be defective is that its generality leaves 
 
(outlining the complexity of the undue hardship defense in the encroachment and 
nuisance contexts). 
108 See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo. 1951)(“A study of 
many decisions discloses no specific and universally-accepted rule as to encroachments.”). 
109 See, e.g., Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895) (granting an injunction for a perma-
nent trespass). 
110 See Rylands, 235 P.2d at 595 (“[W]here the encroachment was in good faith, we 
think the court should weigh the circumstances so that it shall not act oppressively.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011) (provid-
ing that a mistaken improver “has a claim in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust 
enrichment”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION:  QUASI CONTRACTS AND CON-
STRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 42(1) (1937) (providing that, in the case of a building encroach-
ment, where a trespasser’s “mistake was reasonable,” the plaintiff is entitled to an 
injunction only if she compensates the defendant to the extent that her land was “in-
creased in value” by the encroachment); see also Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers 
of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37, 42-49 (1985) (discussing the range of relief available to 
mistaken improvers). 
111 Rylands, 235 P.2d at 595. 
112 See CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 94-107 (T.F.T. Plucknett 
& J.L. Barton eds., 1974) (discussing the function of equity as a corrective principle). 
113 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 317 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1982); see also, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889) (quoting Aristotle 
for the proposition that equity prevents exceptionally strained applications of rigid 
rules of law); Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws to Particular Cases:  A 
Defense of Equity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
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loopholes for bad faith actors—namely, opportunists.114  General con-
cepts, including legal concepts and rules, are useful because they are 
general (as many including de Tocqueville and Hayek recognized), but 
they leave the door open to misuse.  Law can afford to be simple as long 
as it is backed up by equitable anti-opportunism principles. 
C.  Complexity and the Conflict Between 
Reductionism and Holism 
 Finally, in an even more speculative vein, the cognitive approach 
to the economy of concepts suggests a reconciliation between seem-
ingly inconsistent perspectives in property theory.  Property theorists 
can typically be described as either reductionists or holists.  Reduction-
ists, including those in law and economics, want to reduce property to 
something smaller or make property reflect directly the purposes it 
serves—be they efficiency, fairness, or even, in a way, human flourish-
ing.115  Holists, by contrast, emphasize the unity of ownership (as in 
civil law), the pluralism of ends in property, or the irreducible social 
dimension of property.116  The cognitive theory allows us to be, in 
Simon’s words, “in principle” reductionists and practical holists.117  
This combination could be termed “pragmatic holism” (or “pragmatic 
 
263, 270-75 (1996) (documenting the influence of Aristotelian equity on the develop-
ment of Anglo-American law).  But cf. Darien Shanske, Comment, Four Theses:  Prelimi-
nary to an Appeal to Equity, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2053, 2066-68 (2005) (arguing that 
Aristotle’s equity was not primarily legal but instead a “personal virtue”). 
114 See supra note 103; see also Dennis Klimchuk, Is the Law of Equity Equitable in 
Aristotle’s Sense? 4 (June 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www. 
law.ucla.edu/workshops-colloquia/Documents/Klimchuk.%20Is%20the%20Law%20of%20 
Equity%20Equitable%20in%20Aristotles%20Sense.pdf (“Correction is sometimes 
necessary because all law is universal and, owing to its universality, can lead to er-
ror in particular cases.”). 
115 See Smith, supra note 97, at 967-68 (discussing the single-mindedness of main-
stream theories of property). 
116 See, e.g., DAGAN supra note 28, at 72 (“The legal conventions encapsulated in 
property law . . . do not merely supply an assortment of disconnected choices.  Ra-
ther, . . . they offer a repertoire that responds to various forms of valuable human inter-
action.”); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 1597, 1638 (2008) (supporting the pluralist approach to property that first de-
mands “recogni[tion] of the influence of a diversity of institutions, communities, and 
corresponding perspectives and “then seeks to draw meaning from that mosaic”); Emily 
Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1082 (1997) 
(treating property “as a social institution, justified by the advantages that the institution 
of property rights provides to all”). 
117 Simon, supra note 49, at 468. 
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reductionism”).118  When we develop the tools for analyzing how the 
law (or other systems) deal with complexity, it turns out that, for most 
purposes, reductionism and holism are not far apart.  I have argued 
something similar with respect to torts-—that the modularity employed 
by tort law makes an economic account more congruent with the law 
and with basic morality than a conventional economic account.119  In 
previous work, Thomas Merrill and I have argued something similar 
about holistic moral theories and information costs120—a special case 
of complexity pointing toward information-cost rationales for practical 
holism.  The potential intractability of a world without property, inclu-
ding its concepts and categories, is one reason that property appears 
to be holistic.  Property manages complexity with concepts. 
CONCLUSION 
Cognitive science allows law and economics to refine its analysis of 
legal concepts and the architecture of property.  Cognitive theory 
shows how the nominalist impulse, associated especially with Legal 
Realism, tends to efface the “intensional level” in law:  there are only 
facts and results, and we are relatively unconstrained in how to relate 
the former to the latter.  Because property employs formal concepts 
and rules—the specific-over-general principle, modularity, and recur-
sion—the law can manage the complex interactions of actors in a 
range of settings, from the personal to the numerous and anonymous. 
The cost-effectiveness of organizing facts one way or another is down-
played by many of the Realists and their successors.121  The cognitive 
theory of property identifies the importance of concepts in reducing 
information costs and building the overall architecture of property.   
 
118 For a defense of pragmatic holism, see Bruce Edmonds, Pragmatic Holism (or 
Pragmatic Reductionism), 4 FOUND. SCI. 57 (1999), which suggests that “a very similar 
range of issues . . . face both the in-principle reductionists and the in-principle holist.” 
119 See Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2,  
2011, at 1, 16-28 (analyzing the modularity of four common issues in tort law). 
120 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1849, 1852-66 (2007) (discussing the moral and economic dimensions of in rem rights). 
121 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 22, at 812 (“[T]he language of transcendental non-
sense . . . is entirely useless when we come to study, describe, predict, and critique legal 
phenomena.”); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) 
(criticizing a conception of the law as a set of rigid rules applied in a “scientific” way); 
see also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9 n.28 (1983) (“The 
indirect effect of category-assignments and the ideological importance of legal categor-
ical schemes have been neglected both by advocates and by legal scholars.”). 
